Even Jinnah did not seriously think
of his plan for partition to be feasible. He was merely playing for the maximum. The British, however, were keen to maintain a foothold in the areas abutting Afghanistan and Central Asia as a part of The Great Game they were playing with the Soviet Union for
influence in the Central Asia.
1946 Elections changed the plans of the League. In 1936–37 Elections, Jinnah had failed badly in his mission to become the single voice of Muslims. In 1946, he achieved his dream. 89.5% of the Muslim seats were won by the Muslim League. The League swept
every Province where Muslims were a minority. Even in Punjab, it fell short, and in Bengal, it formed the government, with the help of Jotindra Nath Mondal, a Dalit leader. In Sind, it fell short of majority by 3 seats, but help from the British and through
some infamous defections, Muslim League managed to form the government in Sind with a wafer-thin majority.
When Nehru rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan for a weak centre and strong provinces with an option to secede, Jinnah openly used the religion card, and used riots and communal violence fanned
by the Muslim Ulama, as well as by the organised hordes of Muslim League to make the partition of India inevitable.
Having achieved the partition on the basis of Two-Nation Theory, the Muslim League was disappointed at not having achieved its objective of getting the full provinces of
Punjab and Bengal. As I pointed out in the map, the original plan was a grand Commonwealth of Pakistan, with the whole of Assam, Bengal and Punjab within Pakistan, with even Delhi in Pakistan, and the rest of India divided into many parts. The Muslim Ulama
was divided into two shades of opinions — The Sufi Barelvi group, supported by the Shi’a and Ahmedi, favoured the Medina approach, i.e. Muslims should perform a voluntary exile to the Medina of Pakistan, gather strength, and then reconquer the
Mecca of India, and complete the conquest of the sub-continent by Islam. Deobandis, on the other hand, supported by the Jamaat-e-Islami of Abu Ala Maudidi favoured the traditional approach. They argued that it would become impossible to convert India to Islam
in a partitioned India. The ultimate objective of both the groups was the same — complete conversion of India to Islam. The believers and their Allah do not allow any accommodation as the Earth is supposed to have been created by Allah for his believers
this background, and the long term objective of vivisection of India and its complete conversion to Islam, it was quite intolerable for the Pakistan establishment, which got reinforced by the large induction of the discharged 2nd World War decommissioned Army
personnel, and a large Army, to even think about letting a Muslim majority Princely State accede to what they looked at as Hindu India.
So when Sheikh Abdullah was able to use his deception to carve out a separate status for J&K, Pakistan saw this as a validation of the Two-Nation Theory. That India had
to accord a special status to its only Muslim majority State completed vindicated the Two-Nation Theory in the eyes of Pakistan and its establishment, and they could sell this snake oil to the Pakistani public. As the Pakistan dream kept fading, this spurious
fantasy kept the public hooked to the dream of Ghazwa-e-Hind, and kept providing the Pakistan Military its essential life support from the public. When Pakistan came into being, it had got one seventh of India’ resources, one sixth of the area, one sixth
of the population, and one third of its Army. This over bloated Army perfected the art of keeping itself relevant by becoming the protector of what is called Nazaria-e-Pakistan, which is nothing but an euphemism for the Two-Nation Theory.
This complicated relationship among the various
organs of the Pakistani establishment, and the Army’s self-styled role of prptector of Nazaria-e-Pakistan has meant that it even espoused Jihad in order to pretend to fulfil the raison-détre behind the existence of Pakistan, i.e. conquer the Mecca
of India from its stronghold of Pakistani Medina. The Army did try but failed, so it changed the narrative in its text books, spun all its defeats as victories. In the world view of Pakistani Army, a defeat in the conventional sense is not really a defeat.
A defeat will happen only when it loses its anchor and will to fight.
When India rectified the mistake it made in 1949 by incorporating Art. 370, and scrapped its provisions, the Islamisation project has received a terminal jolt. After cleansing the Valley, the next project was Jammu. Even
if India had offered J&K to Pakistan, they would have targeted other parts of India, because Two-Nation Theory ultimately seeks to end all plurality and diversity and make the whole world subservient to Allah.
It lost a part of this anchor when it lost Bangladesh. That took away
the unity of Ummat (Ummah) part and deflated the Two-Nation Theory as well as the Medina Project, but the Pakistan Army recovered it by replacing J&K as the Battle of Badr project in its ultimate conquest of the Mecca of India. With J&K slipping away
irrevocably by Art 370 getting abrogated, the remaining part of the anchor has drifted away. That is why the lament in Pakistan is as full of grief as it was after the loss of Bangladesh.
Because that anchor is now gone with the scrapping of 370 provisions, and J&K is now reduced
to a mere UT, Pakistan is facing an existential crisis. The Medina Project has suffered an irredeemable jolt. Two-Nation Theory is over from India. Medina Project is over from Pakistan. The Army does not have anything left to protect.
Pakistan’s reason for existence is gone. Understand
26 Oct 2019/Saturday Source: medium.com